St. John's Law Review
Volume 36, December 1961, Number 1

Article 11

Wills--Probate of Destroyed Will--Instrument Destroyed in
Bombing Raid Held "Fraudulently Destroyed" (In the Matter of Will
of Fox, 9 N.Y.2d 400 (1961))
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 36

a rule of law, one should not be responsible for his conduct unless
he could have reasonably foreseen that his conduct created an
unreasonable risk of danger to a norinal person.2 4 Therefore,
it has been said that persons with pre-existing disorders should
not recover in these cases at all, or should only recover for
damage due to an aggravation of their disorders.2 5 Such a viewpoint would answer the objection that to allow recovery would
be too dangerous an extension of actionable negligence.
New
York may find it necessary to lay down some specific restrictions,
such as the above, on the new rule.

)X
WILLS-PROBATE OF DESTROYED WILL-INSTRUMENT DESTROYED IN BOMBING RAID HELD "FRAUDULENTLY DESTROYED."-

Testator executed a will in Germany, deposited it with a notary
and never regained access to it or possession of it. The wil
was subsequently destroyed in an allied bombing raid, and the
decedent, with knowledge of such destruction, failed to revoke the
will. Upon testator's death petitioner sought to have the will
probated as one fraudulently destroyed under Section 143 of the
Surrogate's Court Act.' Testator's son unsuccessfully contested
the probate of the will in the Surrogate's Court. Upon appeal.
the Appellate Division, in reversing the Surrogate's Court, held
that the will had not been fraudulently destroyed because of
the testator's knowledge of the destruction. 2 In a 4-3 decision,
the Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, held that
a will is considered "fraudulently destroyed" if its destruction
is effected by another without the testator authorizing or directing
the destruction. In the Matter of Will of Fox,. 9 N.Y.2d 400.
174 N.E.2d 499, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1961).
In the absence of statute it is generally held that a properly
executed will which has not been revoked by the testator, and
See Smith, supra note 23, at 252-77.
23, at 76-79; Smith, supra note 23, at 302.
1N.Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 143 provides: "A lost or destroyed will can
be admitted to probate in a Surrogate's Court, but only in case the will
was in existence at the time of the testator's death, or was fraudulently
destroyed in his lifetime, and its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved
by at least two credible witnesses, a correct copy or draft being equivalent
24

25 McNiece, supra note

to one witness."

2 In the Matter of Will of Fox, 9 App. Div. 2d 365, 193 N.Y.S.2d 794
(1st Dep't 1959).
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is lost or destroyed, is admissible to probate. 3 The fact that
the testator has knowledge of the destruction by another has no
bearing on its admissibility as mere knowledge or acquiescence
does not effect a revocation. 4 This rule has been modified by
statute in New York by Section 143 of the Surrogate's Court
Act, which provides that a lost or destroyed will may be admitted
to probate, "but only in case the will was in existence at the time
of the testator's death, or was fraudulently destroyed in his lifetime. .

.

.,
'

Thus, in New York a lost or destroyed will may

be probated if it meets one of these two conditions.
In New York it has been established that "existence" as
used in the statute denotes physical existence of the will and
not mere existence in contemplation of law.6
However, the
phrase "fraudulently destroyed" has not been amenable to such
exactitude. At one time the court was of the opinion that an
actual fraud must have been perpetrated in the destruction of
the will,7 while later cases have permitted constructive fraud to
suffice." In Tinion v. Claffy 9 it was held that the "fraud . . .
must consist in some deceitful contrivance, device or practice to
defeat the wishes . . .of the testator ... ." 1o

However, in In the

Matter of Will of Dorrity11 the court decided that the "destruction
of the will without the knowledge or consent of the testatrix in
3See ATKINSON, WILLS § 97, at 506 (2d ed. 1953).

For an historical

development of the subject, see Dower v. Seeds, 28 W. Va. 113, 57 Am.

Rep. 646 (1886).
4 See ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 507.
5N.Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 143.
6See In the Matter of Will of Kennedy, 167 N.Y. 163, 60 N.E. 442
(1901). "The fact in issue [in regard to N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 1865, the
predecessor of N.Y. SUR. CT. Acr § 143] was whether the instruments
in question were physically in existence at the time of the death of the
testatrix. . . ." Id. at 169, 60 N.E. at 443 (emphasis added). Although
the courts in New York have not given much discussion to the matter,
it can be inferred from the cases themselves that physical existence is
required. If existence in contemplation of law were sufficient then the
phrase "fraudulently destroyed" as used in the statute would be mere surplusage. Since the New York courts do not consider "fraudulently destroyed"
to be mere surplusage, it logically follows that physical existence, and
not existence in contemplation of law is required. For a case where
existence in contemplation of law was considered sufficient, see In the
Matter of Estate of Havel, 156 Minn. 253, 194 N.W. 633 (1923).
7Timon v. Claffy, 45 Barb. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1865), aff'd mer. sub non.
Conroy v. Claffy, 41 N.Y. 619 (1869); In the Matter of Will of De Groot,
IS N.Y. Civ. Proc. 102, 9 N.Y. Supp. 471 (Surr. Ct. 1890).
s Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N.Y. 653 (1866); St. John v. Putnam, 128 Misc.
714, 220 N.Y. Supp. 141 (Sup. Ct. 1927); In the Matter of Will of Dorrity,
118 Misc. 725, 194 N.Y. Supp. 573 (Surr. Ct. 1922).
945 Barb. 438 (Sup. Ct 1865), aff'd men. sub nom. Conroy v. Claffy,
41 N.Y. 619 (1869).
"ld.at 446.
2 118 Misc. 725, 194 N.Y. Supp. 573 (Surr. Ct. 1922).
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disregard of her intention . . . constitutes constructive fraud and

becomes a fraudulent destruction within the meaning of section
143. ....

"I

It

is evident that the cases are in harmony in

requiring some type of fraud although in discord as to what type.
In the instant case the Court was again required to interpret
the phrase "fraudulently destroyed." In so doing Judge Fuld
utilized the reasoning employed in Schultz v. Schultz.13 In that
landmark case, the testator executed a will, deposited it with a
custodian and never regained possession of it. Upon his death
the instrument could not be discovered. The court held "that
either this will was in existence at the time of the death of the
testator, or . . . had been destroyed in his lifetime, without his

knowledge, consent or procurement, or accidentally lost. If so
destroyed, it was done fraudulently as to him. .... ,,14 It is
worthy to note that one of the ostensible characteristics of "constructive fraud" is the testator's ignorance of the destruction of the
will in his lifetime.
The majority in the instant case felt that an analysis of section
143 taken in conjunction with the Schultz case lead to the conclusion
that "the design of the section is solely to require proof that the
lost or destroyed will offered for probate was not destroyed by
the testator anino revocandi." 15 The reasoning employed in the
principal case and the Schultz case is similar but the facts to
which it was applied are different in one very important aspect.
In the instant case, the testator gained knowledge of the will's
destruction before his death, whereas in Schultz the testator was
unaware of such destruction. Since constructive fraud requires
the testator's ignorance of such destruction it is apparent that
the instant case is distinguishable from the Schultz case.16
Tinon v. Claffy 17 was somewhat of an obstacle for the
majority in the principal case. In the Timon case the testator
executed a will which was subsequently destroyed by another in his
presence and by his procurement. However, a valid revocation
12Id. at 728, 194 N.Y. Supp. at 575-76 (emphasis added). But see
In the Matter of Will of Reifield, 36 Misc. 472, 73 N.Y. Supp. 808 (Surr.
Ct. 1901). "As I construe the statute and construe the term 'fraudulently'
as applicable thereto, it appears to me that, in order to come within the
lines thereof, there must be some intervening human agency in motion . . .
to have brought about its destruction." Id. at 474, 73 N.Y. Supp. at 810
(emphasis added). The Reifield decision is a much narrower interpretation
of constructive fraud than is the Dorrity decision.
1335 N.Y. 653 (1866).
14 Id. at 656 (emphasis added).
15 In the Matter of Will of Fox, 9 N.Y.2d 400, 409, 174 N.E.2d 499,
505, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405, 413 (1961).
16 Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N.Y. 653 (1866).
1745 Barb. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1865), aff'd nent. sub nom. Conroy v. Claffy,
41 N.Y. 619 (1869).
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was not effected as two witnesses were not present.' 8 The court
held that though the will remained unrevoked it could not be admitted to probate as one "fraudulently destroyed" because there
was no fraud perpetrated on the testator. Essentially, the facts are
the same. as in the instant case except that in Timon the testator
had attempted a revocation according to statute. However, the
fact stands that in both cases the wills remained unrevoked while
the testators had knowledge of their destruction. The obstacle
presented by Timon was overcome in the present case by the
majority's dismissing Timon as merely standing for the proposition
that a will which is destroyed in the testator's presence and by his
procurement will not be deemed "fraudulently destroyed." 19 Howthe fact that a
ever, the court in Timon based its decision on
20
fraud had not been committed on the testator.
It is obvious from what has been said that the majority in
the case at hand did not require fraud, actual or constructive, as
a prerequisite to declaring a will "fraudulently destroyed." Rather,
the Court stated that the term "fraudulently destroyed" has nothing
to do with the motive for destruction, but solely with the agency
of the destruction.21 If the will is destroyed by someone other
than the testator "without his authorizing or directing it," 22 then
upon the testator's death it should be admitted to probate. Thus
we now have a much more expansive interpretation of the phrase
"fraudulently destroyed."
The dissent, however, was quite explicit in declaring that some
type of fraud is necessary before a will can be declared "fraudulently destroyed."
As did the majority, Chief Judge Desmond
relied on the Schultz case. It was cited by the dissent to emphasize
that the fraud referred to in section 143 "is a fraud upon the
testator," 23 thus stressing that the court in that case required fraud.
After relegating the Schultz case to this position, the dissent stated
that the Tiinwn case has settled the question as to whether or
not an unrevoked will destroyed in the testator's lifetime would
be admitted to probate if he had knowledge of such destruction.
EST. LAW § 34.
19 In the Matter of Will of Fox, mtpra note 15, at 410, 174 N.E.2d at

Is See N.Y. DEcEn.

505,2 0214 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
Timon v. Claffy, 45 Barb. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1865), aff'd mem. sub non.
It is interesting to note that the
Conroy v. Claffy, 41 N.Y. 619 (1869).
majority in the instant case felt that Tinon had been affirmed on other
grounds. This appears to be an assumption, as the Court of Appeals' determination of the case was without opinion. The majority in the principal
case distinguished Timon only after assuming arguendo that it had been

affirmed on the question of fraud.
21 In the Matter of Will of Fox, supra note 15, at 409, 174 N.E.2d at
504, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
22 Ibid.
23 Schultz v. Schultz, supra note-.16, at- 655 (emphasis added)..

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOT.. 36

"A testator who knows that his testament has been annihilated and
accepts the fact and does nothing about it despite a reasonable
opportunity to make a new will has not been the victim of a
fraud, actual or constructive." 24 Thus, the dissent is of the
opinion that some type of fraud is necessary to satisfy the phrase
"fraudulently destroyed," and that the testator's knowledge of
destruction, either at the time thereof or subsequent thereto, will
refute the contention of fraud.
The Court of Appeals' construction of the phrase "fraudulently
destroyed" in the principal case has rounded out the judicial definition of that phrase. The indefinite nature of the phrase has concerned both the bar and the bench. The instant case has to a
great degree eliminated this indefiniteness and given the phrase a
meaning capable of practical application. Almost every will destroyed in the testator's lifetime which remains unrevoked will
now be admitted to probate; it is no longer necessary for the court
to adopt a somewhat strained definition of constructive fraud.
However, cases which present facts similar to Tinton will not
come within the purview of the definition. It would appear then
that if an ineffective attempt is made by the testator to revoke*
his will and such attempt causes the destruction of the instrument,
then it is not "fraudulently destroyed."
The Court in the instant case, for all practical purposes,
has rendered the word "fraudulently" mere surplusage. Perhaps, in
view of the fact that the courts have found the phrase to be
unworkable, it is"timely for the legislature to amend section 143.
"Fraudulently destroyed" should be replaced by a phrase more
in consonance with court construction of that section.

2

4 In the Matter of Will of Fox, supra note 15, at 413, 174 N.E.2d at
507, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 416 (dissenting opinion).

